An auction-based incentive mechanism for non-altruistic cooperative ARQ via spectrum-leasing

Igor Stanojev, Osvaldo Simeone, Umberto Spagnolini, Yeheskel Bar-Ness, Raymond L. Pickholtz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose and analyze a novel decentralized mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative stations to participate as relays in cooperative ARQ protocol. Cooperation incentive is provided by the possibility for the source to lease a portion of retransmission slot for the traffic of relaying terminals. To further leverage the opportunistic nature of cooperative ARQ and obtain a fully decentralized solution, the (motivated) relaying nodes compete for access to the retransmission slot by trying to make the best retransmission offer. Effective arbitration of cooperative retransmissions is performed using auction theory (bidding), with the source in the role of the auctioneer, the relaying nodes acting as the bidders and the (use of the) retransmission slot as the bidding article. It is noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights model (spectrum leasing). Numerical results and analysis confirm the efficient dynamic resource allocation property of the proposed scheme, revealing the relevant gains in terms of expected number of (re)transmissions required for successful data delivery for both the source (primary) and the cooperating (secondary) nodes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009 - Honolulu, HI, United States
Duration: Nov 30 2009Dec 4 2009

Publication series

NameGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

Other

Other2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu, HI
Period11/30/0912/4/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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