TY - GEN

T1 - Attack Resilient Interconnected Second Order Systems

T2 - 58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019

AU - Pirani, Mohammad

AU - Taylor, Joshua A.

AU - Sinopoli, Bruno

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.

PY - 2019/12

Y1 - 2019/12

N2 - This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first control law, each agent receives pure velocity feedback from its neighbor. In the second control law, each agent receives its velocity relative to its neighbors. The attacker selects a subset of nodes in which to inject a signal, and its objective is to maximize the {{\mathcal{H}}-2} norm of the system from the attack signal to the output. The defender improves the resilience of the system by adding self-feedback loops to certain nodes of the network with the objective of minimizing the system's {{\mathcal{H}}-2} norm. Their decisions comprise a strategic game. Graph-theoretic necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria are presented. In the case of no Nash equilibrium, a Stackelberg game is discussed, and the optimal solution when the defender acts as the leader is characterized. For the case of a single attacked node and a single defense node, it is shown that the optimal location of the defense node for each of the control laws is determined by a specific network centrality measure. The extension of the game to the case of multiple attacked and defense nodes is also addressed.

AB - This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first control law, each agent receives pure velocity feedback from its neighbor. In the second control law, each agent receives its velocity relative to its neighbors. The attacker selects a subset of nodes in which to inject a signal, and its objective is to maximize the {{\mathcal{H}}-2} norm of the system from the attack signal to the output. The defender improves the resilience of the system by adding self-feedback loops to certain nodes of the network with the objective of minimizing the system's {{\mathcal{H}}-2} norm. Their decisions comprise a strategic game. Graph-theoretic necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria are presented. In the case of no Nash equilibrium, a Stackelberg game is discussed, and the optimal solution when the defender acts as the leader is characterized. For the case of a single attacked node and a single defense node, it is shown that the optimal location of the defense node for each of the control laws is determined by a specific network centrality measure. The extension of the game to the case of multiple attacked and defense nodes is also addressed.

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U2 - 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9029630

DO - 10.1109/CDC40024.2019.9029630

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85082459007

T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

SP - 4391

EP - 4396

BT - 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2019

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Y2 - 11 December 2019 through 13 December 2019

ER -