TY - JOUR
T1 - Blockchain-Based P2P Content Delivery With Monetary Incentivization and Fairness Guarantee
AU - He, Songlin
AU - Lu, Yuan
AU - Tang, Qiang
AU - Wang, Guiling
AU - Wu, Chase Qishi
N1 - Funding Information:
The work of Yuan Lu is supported in part by National Key R&D Project of China under Grant 2022YFB2701600, in part by NSFC under Grant 62102404, and in part by Youth Innovation Promotion Association CAS. The work of Songlin He is supported in part by Sichuan Science and Technology Program under Grant 2021YFG0040. The work of Qiang Tang is supported in part by gifts from Ethereum Foundation, Stellar Foundations and Protocol Labs. The work of Guiling Wang is supported in part by FHWA EAR Project under Grant 693JJ320C000021
Publisher Copyright:
© 1990-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2023/2/1
Y1 - 2023/2/1
N2 - Peer-to-peer (P2P) content delivery is up-and-coming to provide benefits comprising cost-saving and scalable peak-demand handling compared with centralized content delivery networks (CDNs), and also complementary to the popular decentralized storage networks such as Filecoin. However, reliable P2P delivery demands proper enforcement of delivery fairness, i.e., the deliverers should be rewarded in line with their in-time delivery. Unfortunately, most existing studies on delivery fairness are on the basis of non-cooperative game-theoretic assumptions that are arguably unrealistic in the ad-hoc P2P setting. We propose an expressive yet still minimalist security requirement for desired fair P2P content delivery, and give two efficient blockchain-enabled and monetary-incentivized solutions ${\mathsf {FairDownload}}$FairDownload and ${\mathsf {FairStream}}$FairStream for P2P downloading and P2P streaming scenarios, respectively. Our designs not only ensure delivery fairness where deliverers are paid (nearly) proportional to their in-time delivery, but also guarantee exchange fairness where content consumers and content providers are also fairly treated. The fairness of each party can be assured even when other two parties collude to arbitrarily misbehave. Our protocols provide a general design of fetching content chunk from any specific position so the delivery can be resumed in the presence of unexpected interruption. Further, our systems are efficient in the sense of achieving asymptotically optimal on-chain costs and optimal delivery communication. We implement the prototype and deploy on the Ethereum Ropsten network. Extensive experiments in both LAN and WAN settings are conducted to evaluate the on-chain costs as well as the efficiency of downloading and streaming. Experimental results show the practicality and efficiency of our protocols.
AB - Peer-to-peer (P2P) content delivery is up-and-coming to provide benefits comprising cost-saving and scalable peak-demand handling compared with centralized content delivery networks (CDNs), and also complementary to the popular decentralized storage networks such as Filecoin. However, reliable P2P delivery demands proper enforcement of delivery fairness, i.e., the deliverers should be rewarded in line with their in-time delivery. Unfortunately, most existing studies on delivery fairness are on the basis of non-cooperative game-theoretic assumptions that are arguably unrealistic in the ad-hoc P2P setting. We propose an expressive yet still minimalist security requirement for desired fair P2P content delivery, and give two efficient blockchain-enabled and monetary-incentivized solutions ${\mathsf {FairDownload}}$FairDownload and ${\mathsf {FairStream}}$FairStream for P2P downloading and P2P streaming scenarios, respectively. Our designs not only ensure delivery fairness where deliverers are paid (nearly) proportional to their in-time delivery, but also guarantee exchange fairness where content consumers and content providers are also fairly treated. The fairness of each party can be assured even when other two parties collude to arbitrarily misbehave. Our protocols provide a general design of fetching content chunk from any specific position so the delivery can be resumed in the presence of unexpected interruption. Further, our systems are efficient in the sense of achieving asymptotically optimal on-chain costs and optimal delivery communication. We implement the prototype and deploy on the Ethereum Ropsten network. Extensive experiments in both LAN and WAN settings are conducted to evaluate the on-chain costs as well as the efficiency of downloading and streaming. Experimental results show the practicality and efficiency of our protocols.
KW - Blockchain application
KW - content delivery
KW - delivery fairness
KW - monetary incentivization
KW - peer-to-peer
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85141544581&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/TPDS.2022.3217036
DO - 10.1109/TPDS.2022.3217036
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85141544581
SN - 1045-9219
VL - 34
SP - 746
EP - 765
JO - IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
IS - 2
ER -