Combinatorial Trading Mechanism for Task Allocation1

Wenge Guo, Kendall E. Nygard, Ahmed Kamel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

21 Scopus citations

Abstract

We describe a task reallocation problem among agents, and present on a market-based solution procedure. A new bidding form, which allows agents to sell and buy tasks simultaneously, is proposed. Based on the bidding form and the concept of feasible trading matching, an iterative combinatorial trading mechanism is devised to extend the one-side combinatorial auction mechanism. We show that this mechanism can produce optimal task allocations. An algorithm for feasible trading matching with maximal trading surplus is also presented. Finally, we extend the trading mechanism to deal with task reallocation and team adjustment simultaneously.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication14th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering 2001, CAINE 2001
EditorsAnthony Chung
PublisherInternational Society for Computers and Their Applications (ISCA)
Pages175-180
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781618395344
StatePublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes
Event14th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering, CAINE 2001 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: Nov 27 2001Nov 29 2001

Publication series

Name14th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering 2001, CAINE 2001

Conference

Conference14th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering, CAINE 2001
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLas Vegas
Period11/27/0111/29/01

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems
  • Software
  • General Engineering

Keywords

  • bidding
  • combinatorial auction
  • multi-agent
  • task allocation

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