Dynamic pricing in consolidated ancillary service markets

Joshua A. Taylor, Ashutosh Nayyar, Duncan S. Callaway, Kameshwar Poolla

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Regulation is a costly aspect of power system operation, which has long been inadequately and inconsistently incentivized via ill-formulated pricing schemes, as recently acknowledged by regulators. We propose a pricing formulation in which regulation prices are the optimal dual multipliers or costate of an optimal control problem. More precisely, we use the linear quadratic regulator to formulate a regulation pricing policy. We then construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to induce honest participation among selfish agents. We apply the formulation to a scenario combining traditional frequency regulation and the California Independent System Operator's Flexible Ramping Product.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 European Control Conference, ECC 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages3032-3037
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9783033039629
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event2013 12th European Control Conference, ECC 2013 - Zurich, Switzerland
Duration: Jul 17 2013Jul 19 2013

Publication series

Name2013 European Control Conference, ECC 2013

Conference

Conference2013 12th European Control Conference, ECC 2013
Country/TerritorySwitzerland
CityZurich
Period7/17/137/19/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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