TY - GEN
T1 - Knock, Knock. Who's there? On the security of LG's knock codes
AU - Samuel, Raina
AU - Aviv, Adam J.
AU - Markert, Philipp
AU - Neamtiu, Iulian
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 by The USENIX Association.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Knock Codes are a knowledge-based unlock authentication scheme used on LG smartphones where a user enters a code by tapping or “knocking” a sequence on a 2x2 grid. While a lesser-used authentication method, as compared to PINs or Android patterns, there is likely a large number of Knock Code users; we estimate, 700,000-2,500,000 in the US alone. In this paper, we studied Knock Codes security asking participants in an online study to select codes on mobile devices in three settings: a control treatment, a blocklist treatment, and a treatment with a larger, 2x3 grid. We find that Knock Codes are significantly weaker than other deployed authentication, e.g., PINs or Android patterns. In a simulated attacker setting, 2x3 grids offered no additional security. Blocklisting, on the other hand, was more beneficial, making Knock Codes' security similar to Android patterns. Participants expressed positive perceptions of Knock Codes, yet usability was challenged. SUS values were “marginal” or “ok” across treatments. Based on these findings, we recommend deploying blocklists for selecting a Knock Code because they improve security but have a limited impact on usability perceptions.
AB - Knock Codes are a knowledge-based unlock authentication scheme used on LG smartphones where a user enters a code by tapping or “knocking” a sequence on a 2x2 grid. While a lesser-used authentication method, as compared to PINs or Android patterns, there is likely a large number of Knock Code users; we estimate, 700,000-2,500,000 in the US alone. In this paper, we studied Knock Codes security asking participants in an online study to select codes on mobile devices in three settings: a control treatment, a blocklist treatment, and a treatment with a larger, 2x3 grid. We find that Knock Codes are significantly weaker than other deployed authentication, e.g., PINs or Android patterns. In a simulated attacker setting, 2x3 grids offered no additional security. Blocklisting, on the other hand, was more beneficial, making Knock Codes' security similar to Android patterns. Participants expressed positive perceptions of Knock Codes, yet usability was challenged. SUS values were “marginal” or “ok” across treatments. Based on these findings, we recommend deploying blocklists for selecting a Knock Code because they improve security but have a limited impact on usability perceptions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091827128&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85091827128&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091827128
T3 - Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS 2020
SP - 37
EP - 60
BT - Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS 2020
PB - USENIX Association
T2 - 16th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS 2020
Y2 - 10 August 2020 through 11 August 2020
ER -