ODSBR: An on-demand secure Byzantine resilient routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks

Baruch Awerbuch, Reza Curtmola, David Holmer, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Herbert Rubens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

109 Scopus citations


Ah hoc networks offer increased coverage by using multihop communication. This architecture makes services more vulnerable to internal attacks coming from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network, also referred to as Byzantine attacks. In this work, we examine the impact of several Byzantine attacks performed by individual or colluding attackers. We propose ODSBR, the first on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks that provides resilience to Byzantine attacks caused by individual or colluding nodes. The protocol uses an adaptive probing technique that detects a malicious link after log n faults have occurred, where n is the length of the path. Problematic links are avoided by using a route discovery mechanism that relies on a new metric that captures adversarial behavior. Our protocol never partitions the network and bounds the amount of damage caused by attackers. We demonstrate through simulations ODSBR's effectiveness in mitigating Byzantine attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these attacks versus the adversary's effort gives insights into their relative strengths, their interaction, and their importance when designing multihop wireless routing protocols.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number18
JournalACM Transactions on Information and System Security
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jan 1 2008
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Computer Science
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality


  • Ad hoc wireless networks
  • Byzantine failures
  • On-demand routing
  • Security


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