TY - GEN
T1 - Secondary spectrum market
T2 - 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016
AU - Ghosh, Arnob
AU - Sarkar, Saswati
AU - Berry, Randall
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2016/8/10
Y1 - 2016/8/10
N2 - In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the channel state information (CSI) of its competitors. We consider a model where a primary can acquire its competitors CSI at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire its competitor's CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. Our result shows that no primary decide to acquire its competitor's CSI with an absolute certainty. When the cost of acquiring the CSI is above a threshold, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) where both the primaries remain uninformed of their respective competitor's CSI. When the cost is below the threshold, in the unique NE each primary randomizes between its decision to acquire the CSI or not. Our result reveals that irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI, the expected payoff of a primary remains the same.
AB - In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the channel state information (CSI) of its competitors. We consider a model where a primary can acquire its competitors CSI at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire its competitor's CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. Our result shows that no primary decide to acquire its competitor's CSI with an absolute certainty. When the cost of acquiring the CSI is above a threshold, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) where both the primaries remain uninformed of their respective competitor's CSI. When the cost is below the threshold, in the unique NE each primary randomizes between its decision to acquire the CSI or not. Our result reveals that irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI, the expected payoff of a primary remains the same.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84985916565&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576
DO - 10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541576
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84985916565
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
SP - 1636
EP - 1640
BT - Proceedings - ISIT 2016; 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 10 July 2016 through 15 July 2016
ER -