Spectrum leasing via distributed cooperation in cognitive radio

The concept of cognitive radio (or secondary spectrum access) is currently under investigation as a promising paradigm to achieve efficient use of the frequency resource. In this paper, we consider a decentralized cognitive radio model based on spectrum leasing, whereby a primary (licensed) user leases its bandwidth for a fraction of time to a network of independent secondary (unlicensed) terminals in exchange for cooperation. On one hand, the primary user decides whether to exploit (space-time coded) cooperation from the network of secondary terminals in order to maximize its own transmission rate. On the other hand, secondary terminals accept to cooperate with the primary only if compensated with a large enough fraction of time for their own transmission, towards the goal of maximizing their rate discounted by the overall cost of transmitted power. The considered model is studied in the framework of Stackelberg games, with the primary and the set of secondary users modelled as the (Stackelberg) game leader and the follower, respectively. Numerical results show that spectrum leasing based on trading secondary spectrum access for cooperation is a promising framework for cognitive radio.