Wireless secrecy in cellular systems with infrastructure-aided cooperation

Petar Popovski, Osvaldo Simeone

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations


In cellular systems, confidentiality of uplink transmission with respect to eavesdropping terminals can be ensured by creating intentional interference via scheduling of concurrent downlink transmissions. In this paper, this basic idea is explored from an information-theoretic standpoint by focusing on a two-cell scenario where the involved base stations (BSs) are connected via a finite-capacity backbone link. A number of transmission strategies are considered that aim at improving uplink confidentiality under constraints on the downlink rate that acts as an interfering signal. The strategies differ mainly in the way the backbone link is exploited by the cooperating downlink to the uplink-operated BSs. Achievable rates are derived for both the Gaussian (unfaded) and the fading cases, under different assumptions on the channel state information available at different nodes. Numerical results are also provided to corroborate the analysis. Extensions to scenarios with more than two cells are briefly discussed as well. Overall, the analysis reveals that a combination of scheduling and base-station cooperation is a promising means to improve transmission confidentiality in cellular systems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4895697
Pages (from-to)242-256
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications


  • Cellular systems
  • perfect secrecy
  • physical-layer wireless security
  • wire-tap channel
  • wireless infrastructure networks
  • wireless interference


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