Wireless spectrum sharing via waiting-line auction

Tao Han; Tianyi Xing; Ning Zhang; Kaiming Liu; Bihua Tang; Yuan'an Liu

doi:10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737339

Wireless spectrum sharing via waiting-line auction

Tao Han, Tianyi Xing, Ning Zhang, Kaiming Liu, Bihua Tang, Yuan'an Liu

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We propose a wireless spectrum sharing framework based on waiting-line auction [1]. Our framework includes both spectrum assignment and power allocation; it is designed to maximize the primary user's profits as well as to optimize the overall rate under secondary users' minimal rate requirements. On secondary users' side, it is proved that bidders could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy function, which relate to their valuations for communications. For the primary user, we design a low-complexity auction clearing algorithm that considers both primary user's revenue and the system overall rate.

Original language	English (US)
Pages	1031-1035
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737339
State	Published - 2008
Externally published	Yes
Event	2008 11th IEEE Singapore International Conference on Communication Systems, ICCS 2008 - Guangzhou, China Duration: Nov 19 2008 → Nov 21 2008

Conference

Conference	2008 11th IEEE Singapore International Conference on Communication Systems, ICCS 2008
Country/Territory	China
City	Guangzhou
Period	11/19/08 → 11/21/08

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Communication

Keywords

Dynamic spectrum sharing
Game theory
Power allocation
Waiting-line auction
Water-filling

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10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737339

Cite this

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abstract = "We propose a wireless spectrum sharing framework based on waiting-line auction [1]. Our framework includes both spectrum assignment and power allocation; it is designed to maximize the primary user's profits as well as to optimize the overall rate under secondary users' minimal rate requirements. On secondary users' side, it is proved that bidders could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy function, which relate to their valuations for communications. For the primary user, we design a low-complexity auction clearing algorithm that considers both primary user's revenue and the system overall rate.",

keywords = "Dynamic spectrum sharing, Game theory, Power allocation, Waiting-line auction, Water-filling",

author = "Tao Han and Tianyi Xing and Ning Zhang and Kaiming Liu and Bihua Tang and Yuan'an Liu",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737339",

language = "English (US)",

pages = "1031--1035",

note = "2008 11th IEEE Singapore International Conference on Communication Systems, ICCS 2008 ; Conference date: 19-11-2008 Through 21-11-2008",

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TY - CONF

T1 - Wireless spectrum sharing via waiting-line auction

AU - Han, Tao

AU - Xing, Tianyi

AU - Zhang, Ning

AU - Liu, Kaiming

AU - Tang, Bihua

AU - Liu, Yuan'an

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We propose a wireless spectrum sharing framework based on waiting-line auction [1]. Our framework includes both spectrum assignment and power allocation; it is designed to maximize the primary user's profits as well as to optimize the overall rate under secondary users' minimal rate requirements. On secondary users' side, it is proved that bidders could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy function, which relate to their valuations for communications. For the primary user, we design a low-complexity auction clearing algorithm that considers both primary user's revenue and the system overall rate.

AB - We propose a wireless spectrum sharing framework based on waiting-line auction [1]. Our framework includes both spectrum assignment and power allocation; it is designed to maximize the primary user's profits as well as to optimize the overall rate under secondary users' minimal rate requirements. On secondary users' side, it is proved that bidders could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy function, which relate to their valuations for communications. For the primary user, we design a low-complexity auction clearing algorithm that considers both primary user's revenue and the system overall rate.

KW - Dynamic spectrum sharing

KW - Game theory

KW - Power allocation

KW - Waiting-line auction

KW - Water-filling

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DO - 10.1109/ICCS.2008.4737339

M3 - Paper

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T2 - 2008 11th IEEE Singapore International Conference on Communication Systems, ICCS 2008

Y2 - 19 November 2008 through 21 November 2008

ER -

Wireless spectrum sharing via waiting-line auction

Abstract

Conference

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

Access to Document

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